This article surveys and analyzes twenty-four governmental and intergovernmental bodies that are currently active in peacebuilding in order to, first, identify critical differences in how they conceptualize and operationalize their mandate, and, second, map areas of potential concern. We begin by briefly outlining the various terms used by different actors to describe their peacebuilding activities and correlate these terms with differing core mandates, networks of interaction, and interests. We then identify the divisions regarding the specific approaches and areas of priority. Thus far most programs have focused on the immediate or underlying causes of conflict-to the relative neglect of state institutions. We conclude by raising concerns about how peacebuilding is institutionalized in various settings, including at the UN's Peacebuilding Commission. KEY-WORDS: peacebuilding, postconflict reconstruction, peacekeeping, United Nations.
T hirteen years ago, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali unveiled the concept of postconflict peacebuilding, defining it as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict." 1 Since then practitioners, scholars, international and regional organizations, and states have attempted to better identify what institutionalizes peace after war and what the critical ingredients and steps likely to further that goal are. If the success of peacebuilding is measured against how well it has, indeed, institutionalized peace, the picture is very mixed. Nearly 50 percent of all countries receiving assistance slide back into conflict within five years, and 72 percent of peacebuilding operations leave in place authoritarian regimes. 2 If, however, success is measured in terms of the institutionalization of the concept of peacebuilding, then it appears to be a resounding success. An impressive number of organizations contribute to the cause of ending and preventing deadly conflict and use the concept to frame and organize their postconflict activities. Every indication, moreover, is that the demand for peacebuilding will increase further because the long-term concern about ending civil wars has now been joined by the fear that weak states pose a major threat to international stability. 3 Perhaps the surest sign of the thriving peacebuilding agenda is the decision by the 2005 World Summit at the UN to endorse UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's proposals to create a peacebuilding commission, support office, and fund. When implemented, these structures will institutionalize peacebuilding at the highest levelsand increase the incentives for others to join the peacebuilding bandwagon.
Although peacebuilding is generically defined as external interventions that are designed to prevent the eruption or return of armed conflict, there are critical differences among actors regarding its conceptualization and operationalization. This article surveys and analyzes twenty-four governmental and intergovernmental bodies that are currently active in peacebuilding in order to, first, identify critical differences in how they conceptualize and operationalize their mandate and, second, map areas of potential concern. Our survey includes actors who are the largest funders or implementers of international peacebuilding assistance and who are likely to participate in a future UN Peacebuilding Commission. 4 In the first section we briefly outline the various terms used by different actors to describe their peacebuilding activities and correlate these terms with differing core mandates, networks of interaction, and interests. Although different terms are used to describe postconflict peacebuilding, there are even greater divisions regarding the specific approaches that might achieve it, which is the focus of the second section. Some programs focus on the production of stability and security in the early days of a peace agreement's implementation, while others focus on building vibrant civil societies and furthering development, democracy, justice, and the rule of law. Although there are various reasons for these differing priorities, the prevailing organizational mandates and interests are an important part of the explanation. Thus far, though, programs have focused on the immediate or underlying causes of conflict-to the relative neglect of state institutions. This neglect is a possible artifact of the ingrained belief by wealthy countries that liberalization, largely defined as the movement toward democracy, markets, and the rule of law, is the best way to develop a positive peace in poor ones. In this respect, international peacebuilders have demonstrated greater concern with the kind of state being built rather than its degree. There is evidence, however, that this neglect is being redressed. Although this greater attention is overdue, to the extent that it is driven by a fear that weak states create a permissive environment for terrorist and criminal networks, it might create a willingness to be more concerned with the degree of the state rather than the kind.
By way of conclusion, we discuss several policy implications. Although we see a lot of interest in peacebuilding, much of it is at the level of rhetoric and not at the level of resources. The danger, therefore, is that while peacebuilding looks highly supported on paper, in fact it receives little meaningful financial and political support relative to the costs of renewed conflict.
Second, we need to be very cognizant of the particular version of peacebuilding that is being institutionalized. There are important differences in how various actors see the complex task of peacebuilding and the many priorities it entails. Debates among agencies over how to implement peacebuilding in particular areas must not be settled by bureaucratic power but by the recipient states themselves, with international actors helping inform their choices by access to evidence-based arguments (and an acknowledgment that the evidence is limited and analysis highly provisional). These are critical issues to keep in mind at the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Finally, agencies must focus more attention on creating state institutions that can deliver basic public goods in an equitable manner. Although the state is not the only institution that underpins stability, pursuing peacebuilding without an institutional foundation is a recipe for failure.
Peacebuilding and Its Aliases
Peacebuilding is generically understood as external interventions that are intended to reduce the risk that a state will erupt into or return to war. Yet, as captured in Table 1 , different agencies use a wide variety of terms that are related to but are not necessarily synonymous with peacebuilding. Even more confusing, some use the same term, peacebuilding, in slightly different ways. Different groupings clearly emerge: the UN Secretariat, UN specialized agencies, European organizations, and member states. This differentiation, as we suggest below, owes partly to prevailing organizational mandates and networks. The organization's core mandate will heavily influence its reception to, and definition and revision of, the concept of peacebuilding. Moreover, organizations do not exist in isolation but instead are nested in structured relationships and exchange of resources and information; those that are linked have tended to converge on a consensus definition. 5 The UN Secretariat continues to build on former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's original formulation: "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict." 6 At the UN, "peacebuilding" complements the organization's peacemaking and peacekeeping functions. In his Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali expanded on the basic ideas behind peacebuilding and then defined its essential goal as "the creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace." 7 Since then, other units within the Secretariat have modified and refined this formulation. As Charles Call notes in his review of peacebuilding at the UN, at this point the UN introduced two important clarifications. One, it began to emphasize that peacebuilding is more than the elimination of armed conflict; after all, stability can be achieved by the balance or threat of force. Instead, it involves the creation crisis management is imminent (conflict prevention in a narrow sense) but also at preventing the occurrence of such a situation (conflict prevention in a wider sense). (FMD) they undertake a variety of tasks ranging from reform of the security forces and demobilization of combatants to the rebuilding of the justice system and government structures and preparations for elections.
(continues) Table 1 of a positive peace, the elimination of the root causes of conflict so that actors no longer have the motive to use violence to settle their differences. The other clarification, a logical implication of the first, is that the same technologies that are used to help build peace after war also can be used to help societies avoid war in the first instance. In other words, peacebuilding is conflict prevention by another name and, therefore, "postconflict" often modifies peacebuilding to distinguish it from conflict prevention. 8 In early 2000 the Brahimi Report on Peacekeeping Reform further refined the definition of peacebuilding: "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war." 9 Although the report stressed how peacebuilding comes after conflict, and thus intentionally bracketed its applicability to conflict prevention, this restriction primarily owed to the commission's mandate to review peacekeeping operations in the main (and to bracket what comes afterwards). The Department of Political Affairs within the Secretariat was given the lead in peacebuilding policy and UNDP in peacebuilding assistance programs. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations tends to refer to all its operations as peacekeeping. Arguably its abstinence owes less to a principled opposition to peacebuilding and more to the view that peacebuilding is outside its mandate and it has a vested interest in ensuring that these areas are treated as distinctive, if related and sequential, activities. In any event, the definition offered in the Brahimi Report proved highly influential, informing discussions at the UN on postconflict assistance. 10 The UN's specialized agencies have adopted other concepts, a pattern that probably owes to how peacebuilding fits into their broader core mandates. Consider the international financial and development agencies, which introduced postconflict activities and terms in 1995. UNDP uses both peacebuilding and conflict prevention because it has a mandate in both. It adopted the definition used in the Brahimi Report, and then observed how peacebuilding and conflict prevention are virtually synonymous (and uses the two concepts interchangeably). In doing so, it signaled that its real concern is with conflict prevention; therefore, the organization should be as concerned with preventing conflict from returning as with stopping it before it begins. The concept of peacebuilding is less attractive to organizations with no direct mandate in peacekeeping. This is particularly true for the international financial institutions, whose mandates potentially conflict with their charge to be apolitical and not meddle in the domestic affairs of states. The World Bank tends to avoid the concept of peacebuilding and its connotations of active interference in favor of postconflict reconstruction and postconflict recovery; in many respects, this represents a return to its original mandate when its involvement in post-World War II reconstruction in Europe gave it its namethe International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The IMF prefers postconflict recovery. When it writes joint documents, it tends to adopt the concept of postconflict recovery.
Outside the UN system there is greater terminological diversity. The European agencies are more likely to avoid peacebuilding in favor of alternative monikers such as civilian crisis management. Here the effort appears to distinguish these efforts from military and security-based stabilization and peace enforcement efforts. The European Union favors the concepts of conflict prevention and management, and rehabilitation and reconstruction: the former pertains to the desire to prevent the outbreak of violence that is imminent (management) and the elimination of facilitating a broader peace process (prevention); the latter pertains to the reestablishment of a working economy and institutional capacity.
Different agencies within the governments of the United States, UK, Canada, Germany, France, and Japan use different terms. The defense departments in the UK and the United States use the concepts of stabilization, reflecting their security missions (although NATO does use the term peacebuilding). The US Agency for International Development has an Office of Transition Initiatives focused on postconflict recovery and an Office for Conflict Management and Mitigation focused on prevention. The UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Department for International Development prefer postconflict reconstruction rather than peacebuilding, but also make reference to peacebuilding since peace-related activities clearly fall within their respective mandates. Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs describes its postconflict work as conflict prevention, but the Canadian government uses peacebuilding to describe its actions in support of peace operations and economic development. Similarly, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses the term conflict prevention, and the Japan International Cooperation Agency, a lead donor to states recovering from conflict, uses the term peacebuilding. The Japan Defense Agency, with a limited role in security provision, describes its peacebuilding involvement as reconstruction assistance. France and Germany share with the European community a preference for civilian crisis management and conflict prevention.
Peacebuilding's popularity can be attributed to a host of factors. To begin, there is a strong interest from both international and domestic actors to help states emerging from civil wars, societal breakdowns, and a violent past. Certainly there is no shortage of demand from below, as many domestic actors look for international assistance in a variety of areas. International actors increasingly view peacebuilding as instrumental to the broader humanitarian and international peace and security agenda. Peacebuilding's place in this agenda helps to explain why so many international actors believe that they can and should contribute to it; not only do they view peacebuilding as related to their core mandate, but peacebuilding also provides an important opportunity to demonstrate their continued relevance. The willingness of so many diverse constituencies with divergent and sometimes conflicting interests to rally around peacebuilding also suggests that one of the concept's talents is to camouflage divisions over how to handle the postconflict challenge. In this respect, it functions much like a favored political symbol. Symbols are often highly ambiguous. Ambiguity can facilitate collective action because different constituencies can support the symbol without necessarily achieving consensus on the substance. National flags, for instance, are potent symbols because most can get behind the flag, though they may do so for highly different, and potentially even conflicting, reasons. The same might be said for peacebuilding. Almost all agree that building peace after war is a good thing but may not agree on why it is a good thing (i.e., because it alleviates human suffering, generates regional stability, or creates conditions for long-term development efforts to take root). There is widespread agreement, as well, that peacebuilding means more than stability promotion; it is designed to create a positive peace, to eliminate the root causes of conflict, to allow states and societies to develop stable expectations of peaceful change. Consensus breaks down, however, over the substance behind the symbol of peacebuilding. Arguably, when the Bush administration thinks of peacebuilding it imagines building market-oriented democracies, while UNDP imagines creating economic development and strong civil societies committed to a culture of nonviolent dispute resolution. These different interpretations over the operationalization of peacebuilding lead to differences over appropriate strategies and priorities; some organizations might highlight democratic elections, transitional justice, and rule of law programs, while others highlight demobilization and private sector reforms. The critical point is that the growing number of international structures whose mandates include peacebuilding might easily mask essential differences regarding the concept's meaning and practice.
The Practices of Postconflict Peacebuilding
Because there are multiple contributing causes of conflict, almost any international assistance effort that addresses any perceived or real grievance can arguably be called "peacebuilding." Moreover, anyone invited to imagine the causes of violent conflict might generate a rather expansive laundry list of issues to be addressed in the postconflict period, including income distribution, land reform, democracy and the rule of law, human security, corruption, gender equality, refugee reintegration, economic development, ethnonational divisions, environmental degradation, transitional justice, and on and on. There are at least two good reasons for such a fertile imagination. One, there is no master variable for explaining either the outbreak of violence or the construction of a positive peace but merely groupings of factors across categories such as greed and grievance, and catalytic events. Variables that might be relatively harmless in some contexts can be a potent cocktail in others. Conversely, we have relatively little knowledge regarding what causes peace or what the paths to peace are. Although democratic states that have reasonably high per capita incomes are at a reduced risk of conflict, being democratic and rich is no guarantor of a positive peace, and illiberal and poor countries, at times, also have had their share of success. Second, organizations are likely to claim that their core competencies and mandates are critical to peacebuilding. They might be right. They also might be opportunistic. After all, if peacebuilding is big business, then there are good bureaucratic reasons for claiming that they are an invaluable partner.
Both of these reasons help explain two patterns regarding the practice of peacebuilding. One, different agencies tend to prioritize different activities. These alternative priorities are shaped not only by their knowledge of how to reduce the risk of conflict but also by a consideration of how they might best and most easily extend their existing mandates and expertise into the postconflict arena. Two, most programs emphasize the immediate and/or long-term demands of peacebuilding, that is, how to reduce the risk that the combatants do not return to war soon after the ink is dry on their peace agreement, and how to create the socioeconomic foundations for a positive peace. Conversely, with few exceptions, they fail to give concentrated attention and resources to state institutions during the critical five-year period when the state is still weak and its authority contested.
Prioritizing the Practices of Peacebuilding
In Table 2 , we divided peacebuilding activities into the following four sectoral categories: security and military; social, economic, developmental, humanitarian; political and diplomatic; and justice and reconciliation. 11 Two important patterns emerge. The first is that different agencies tend to focus on different activities.
The UN Secretariat's units tend to define their activities in a comprehensive manner. Almost all areas of activity are included. However, there are differences between security-oriented and socioeconomic-oriented agencies, which correlate with when they tend to enter into postconflict settings. The departments of political affairs and peacekeeping operations emphasize the political-diplomatic and security-military aspects of peacebuilding, a logical extension of their mandates. UNDP stresses socioeconomic areas. Although the World Bank and IMF focus on economic development, the former emphasizes reconstruction and infrastructure while the latter describes its activities as recovery and technical assistance. The European Union emphasizes the 
political and diplomatic aspects of peacebuilding activities with a growing focus on conflict assessment and early warning activities, which can be understood as part of the security and military terrain. The countries we surveyed exhibit their own patterns. The UK has focused on the security and military sector. The United States began with a strong interest in democratization and economic recovery, but its experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have caused it to refocus attention on stabilization. Japan tends to focus on broad postconflict reconstruction, while France and Germany have focused their attention on immediate postconflict stabilization and long-term democracy promotion and economic reconstruction. There are important interagency differences within these countries. The defense departments, predictably, restrict themselves to the security and military sectors, while USAID and DFID are more "full service" units. Canada's agencies focus more on security, political, justice/reconciliation than on socioeconomic, developmental, or humanitarian aspects of peacebuilding. Japan, similarly, focuses on humanitarian assistance and development.
What accounts for this variation? The most straightforward explanation is that organizations have extended their existing mandates and competencies into the postconflict area, reflecting bureaucratic inertia and building on existing areas of comparative advantage. Both factors lead to a supplyrather than demand-driven menu of postconflict peacebuilding activities. Within UN funds and programs, for example, UNICEF emphasizes reestablishing primary education and working to reintegrate child soldiers back into society, FAO and IFAD emphasize the importance of food security, UNHCR focuses on refugee return, and UNIFEM stresses the opportunities to push for greater gender equity during moments of postconflict transition and reform. Also, certainly organizations are likely to favor those strategies and definitions that will most clearly advantage their bureaucratic interests. As the UNDP noted, "Crisis and post-conflict situations present a major challenge to development assistance but also constitute a unique opportunity for UNDP to demonstrate the importance of its own core mandatethat of building national capacity for long-term growth and sustainable development." 12 Relatedly, there is tremendous overlap between specific tasks and programs. A recent survey reveals that disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) assistance is provided by six major international agencies, security sector reform and rule of law by the same number, repatriation and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons are shared among nine agencies, and six specialized agencies work on health sector issues. 13 This suggests not only the existence of tremendous coordination problems, but also that agencies will attempt to expand when and where possible. 
Dimensions of Peacebuilding
For heuristic purposes it is possible to identify three dimensions of postconflict peacebuilding-stability creation, restoration of state institutions, and addressing the socioeconomic dimensions of conflict. 14 The first dimension is the desire to reinforce stability and discourage the combatants from returning to war. In important respects, peacebuilding continues an important function of peacekeeping, the attempt to maintain a cease-fire and stability by monitoring the combatants. Yet peacebuilding goes beyond this feature of peacekeeping in several ways. Peacebuilding activities directly attempt to reduce the means available, and the incentives, for actors to return to conflict. Toward that end, they include disarmament, demobilization, reintegration programs, security sector reform, and arms control for light and heavy weapons systems. The general claim is that if peace is to prevail, then the toys must be removed from the boys. But it is not enough to try to reduce the material means for going to war. The reintegration of former combatants requires alternative avenues for the pursuit of wealth and social recognition.
The second dimension is helping to build or restore key state functions that have the capacity to generate basic public goods and possess a modicum of legitimacy. A basic function of the state is the production of public goods. But many states, especially those emerging from conflict, are hardpressed to deliver such goods. Accordingly, peacebuilders either replace the state or partner with the state to rebuild basic facilities, public administration, rule of law systems, transportation and communication networks, and utilities, and to re-create the educational and health infrastructure. But because international actors do not envisage playing state-like functions long into the future, they also provide some degree of technical and capacitybuilding assistance for state institutions-even as they support parallel NGO or private sector structures that may operate outside of or duplicate state functions. For instance, international financial institutions typically provide technical assistance so that state institutions can develop the capacity to build, monitor, and regulate basic economic and financial activities. Yet an effective state is not enough. It also is important that the state have legitimacy. Indeed, over half of all the named activities that fall into this dimension of peacebuilding involve programs that are designed to create institutions that are democratic, transparent, accountable, and responsive to local needs-that is, legitimate.
The third dimension is the attempt to build not only the state's but also society's ability to manage conflict peacefully and develop the socioeconomic infrastructure necessary to underpin economic development. Toward that end, peacebuilders are involved in trauma counseling, transitional justice Michael Barnett, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene O'Donnell, Laura Sitea and reconciliation, community dialogue, strengthening civil society organizations, increasing human rights, promoting environmental awareness, assisting with gender empowerment, building bridges between different communities, and promoting economic development. The goal is not only to try to create a culture of peace, but also to try to develop civil society organizations and a viable private sector that have the capacity to represent diverse societal interests and constrain the power of the state.
Do we see any pattern across the categories? At one level, no clear breakdown emerges. Figure 1 sets out activities by stages of peacebuilding, as per the data displayed in Table 2 .
Although it could be that the peacebuilding sector is taking a nonsectarian approach, we suspect that if we weighted indicators or financial data we would see a more discriminatory pattern. While operations suggest that the peacebuilding sector is being equally attentive to all issues, studies of particular operations reveal that it generally gives more priority to one set of activities over another. Also, not all activities cost the same. Investments that fall in the first and third categories (i.e., international provision of security and reconstruction of physical infrastructure) are significantly more costly than investments in the second (public administration).
At another level, though, there is some clustering of peacebuilding activities around the first and third dimensions of peacebuilding to the relative neglect of the second. How do we account for this gap? One explanation is that these patterns reflect a particular image of the state. The modern state "exists when there is a political apparatus (governmental institutions, such as a court, parliament, or congress, plus civil service officials), ruling over a given territory, whose authority is backed by a legal system and the capacity to use force to implement its policies." 15 State building concerns how the modern state comes into existence, that is, how the process of institutionalization is accomplished along two dimensions. One concerns the specific instruments states use to control society. Attention is directed to the monopolization of the means of coercion and the development of a bureaucratic apparatus organized around rational-legal principles with the capacity to regulate, control, and extract from society. The concern, then, is with the degree of the state. The other dimension concerns how states and societies negotiate their relationship-that is, the kind of state. Attention is directed not only to whether the state has the ability to control society but also to the organizing principles that structure the state's rule over society.
Peacebuilding operations have tended to emphasize the kind of state. Efforts around human rights, transitional justice, and democratization, in contrast, are more concerned about the kind of state rather than degree. Although not neglectful of the need to develop state capacity across a range of functions, traditional liberalization efforts prefer a "small state" and focus on creating mechanisms that limit the state's power, increase societal participation, and hence invest the state with legitimacy. Indeed, many peacebuilding programs attempt to create the liberal state, which respects human rights; protects the rule of law; is constrained by representative institutions, a vigilant media, and periodic elections; and protects markets. 16 This liberal bias has been the subject of considerable commentary in recent years, particularly since it might not promote peace. Several observers have noted that the peacebuilding project, far from eliminating the root causes of conflict, creating the liberal-democratic state, or creating an effective ally in international antiterrorism efforts, has only rekindled the conditions for conflict. 17 Locating the cause of this dysfunctional outcome in the hurried way in which peacebuilding operations attempt to open up competition in a raw atmosphere that is absent of security, trust, or stable institutions, they argue in favor of a more sequenced, slower-paced, and strategic peacebuilding project that emphasizes the establishment of security and stable institutions before seeking the prize of liberalization and democracy. 18 Although there is tremendous debate over what the basic functions of the state are (beyond the provision of security) and the minimal degree and kind of state that is required to underpin the peace, several elements are less controversial. To begin, actors must have an incentive to preserve the state and its institutions. What matters, then, is the utility of the state to provide reasonable security guarantees and that powerful actors believe they benefit from a state that can enforce essential rules. In this respect, the test for the emergence of the state is the "appearance of political units persisting in time and fixed in space, the development of permanent, impersonal institutions, agreement on the need for an authority that can give final judgments, and acceptance of the idea that this authority should receive the basic loyalty of its subjects." 19 What is desired, then, is a state that can make credible commitments and deliver on those commitments in a reasonably efficient and impartial manner using rational-legal means (and coercion in the last instance). Although this does not imply the need to neglect the kind of state that is being built, it does suggest the need for more attention to the degree. This is happening. Various state and nonstate agencies recognize that peacebuilding also is state building and that more attention needs to be directed at building a functional, capable state. Yet this growing interest might also be driven by a concern with ensuring that these states can not only deliver basic services but also contain networks that pose a threat to the international community. Led most prominently by the United States, there is a growing interest in making sure that states, especially those emerging from conflict, have the capacity to maintain stability and counter transnational threats. The degree of the state, then, matters not only because it provides a useful function for domestic society, but also for international society. Yet the desire to make sure that the postconflict state is strong enough to contend with uncivil forces might easily undermine the desire to build a liberal state, one that is accountable to society and fastened by the rule of law. If so, then peacebuilding might prove to be successful to the extent that states do not return to war five years after the peace agreement, but a failure to the extent that it leaves in place authoritarian structures.
Conclusion
Peacebuilding is increasingly institutionalized across the international landscape. Most major international and regional organizations, states, and nongovernmental organizations have a program that either explicitly uses this term, adopts an alternative formulation whose practices overlap with the current meaning of peacebuilding, or work with an alternative concept whose activities intersect with peacebuilding. Yet there are several outstanding issues that suggest that this institutionalization is not all it appears to be.
To begin, assessing the degree of the institutionalization of peacebuilding requires more than attention to the organizations and units that are actively associated with this agenda-it also demands a consideration of whether states and organizations are putting resources behind their statements. Although such data is difficult to assemble, our casual survey suggests that the peacebuilding agenda is not necessarily gorging on funds and these activities represent small percentages of the overall budgets. Consider the following examples. Since its establishment in 1997, the World Bank Post-Conflict Fund has disbursed a total of $66.7 million, including $10.6 million in 2004. 20 The 2004 budget for the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives was $54.6 million; in 2005 it was $48.6 million, which means that it received only 3.5 percent of a total USAID budget of $9.1 billion. 21 Consequently, while the peacebuilding agenda might look impressive given its recent origins, it remains diminutive when compared to the traditional activities undertaken by these and other organizations.
Second, notwithstanding a consensus definition emerging at the UN, there continues to be considerable variation in the meaning of peacebuilding because organizations are likely to adopt a meaning of peacebuilding that is consistent with their already existing mandates, worldviews, and organizational interests. The consequence is that while everyone might support the idea of building peace, they will operate with considerable differences of interpretation regarding the meaning and practice of peacebuilding. The impact of existing organizational mandates and worldviews on the variation in the practice of peacebuilding is particularly evident in the actual programs.
This suggests that any consideration of international coordination and collaboration will be more than a technical feat-it also will be profoundly political. Different agencies work with alternative modes of operationalizing peacebuilding, which, in turn, are reflective of different strategies for achieving peace after war. These strategies, though, more often than not, reflect unexamined assumptions and deeply rooted organizational mandates rather than "best practices" born from empirical analysis. This suggests that the desire to achieve coordination requires more than simply dividing up the terrain and creating linkage and efficiencies. It also is a political accomplishment that might be settled by bureaucratic and political power. Some might hope that this tendency might be cured by the proposed Peacebuilding Commission at the UN, which is mandated to help coordinate the postconflict activities of the relevant implementing agencies. Although this move can improve the efficiency and implementation of peacebuilding activities, it also is likely to clarify profound differences among these agencies regarding priorities, mandates, strategies, and trade-offs. Although one of the functions of the proposed Peacebuilding Support Office is to provide critical information so that operational agencies can make informed and reasoned choices, it is quite likely that such knowledge will be unavailable for a while. More complicated still is the process of merging this generalized knowledge with specific circumstances on the ground to yield appropriate recommendations.
Consequently, the institutionalization of peacebuilding might emerge from bureaucratic power and political infighting, and not empirical analysis. Scholars and policymakers should, therefore, monitor to see which version of peacebuilding is being institutionalized and attempt to ensure that alternative understandings are kept alive as alternative hypotheses so that reasoned choices are made at critical junctures. 4. This is a selective, rather than a comprehensive review. We have drawn from available data on official development assistance (ODA), emergency assistance, and assessed contributions to peacekeeping operations in ten postconflict countries (see Appendix 2, p. 57) to identify a list of the key bilateral and multilateral organizations involved in financing or implementing international "peacebuilding" efforts. Appendix 3 (p. 58) lists the actors included in the survey: the United Nations, World Bank, IMF, European Commission, United States, France, Germany, Japan, UK, and Canada. The list of the dozens of documents we reviewed and that inform our analysis are available from Michael Barnett.
Notes
5. We also detect moments when tightly networked agencies attempt to distinguish themselves and protect their turf by developing distinctive definitions of peacebuilding and alternative concepts.
6. Agenda for Peace, para. 21. 
